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Root, Root, Root for the Home Team: Is the FANS
Act of 2001 Really Good for Baseball Fans?*
Imagine for a minute that the American Association of
Cell Phone Manufacturers met in Chicago last week, and at
the meeting thirty of the largest manufacturers got together
for cocktails to identify which of them they could buy out and
close down in order to reduce the output of their product and
maximize the profitability of the remaining manufacturers.
Good idea, right?
But of course we all know that eventually their strategy
wouldfail. It would fail because, first of all, their conspiracy
would very likely be in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
and in an act offairness to all entrepreneurial Americans, the
government would remedy the situation, right? Or maybe if
the government failed to remedy the situation, energetic
young entrepreneurs would start up new manufacturing
companies, through increased competition, driving prices
down and choices for cell phones up.
That is the way it works here in America, right? Exceptfor baseball. f-Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura'
On November 6, 2001, two days after the completion of what was
one of the greatest World Series in history,2 Major League Baseball's
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Since the writing of this article, Major League Baseball has shelved plans
of contraction, although not ruling it out in the future. Also, while the FANS Act
has not been a presumably will not be voted on in Congress, the legal issues raised
in the article still hold true. Finally, for the first time since 1971, when the
Washington Senators moved to Arlington, Texas to become the Texas Rangers,
Major League Baseball has announced the relocation of one of its franchises. On
September 29, 2004, Major League Baseball announced that the Montreal Expos,
who for the previous two seasons had split home games between Montreal and San
Juan, Puerto Rico, were relocating to Washington, D.C. to become the Washington
Nationals. See Press Release, Major League Baseball, Washington, D.C.'s
Proposal Selected by MLB (Sept. 29, 2004), available at http://www.
mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb-press-release.jsp?ymd=20040929&conte
ntid=8751 l0&vkey=prmlb&fext=.jsp.
1. Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001: Hearing on
H.R. 3288 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 16-17 (2001)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Jesse Ventura, Governor, State of Minnesota).
2. The 2001 World Series was played between the Arizona Diamondbacks
and the New York Yankees. The Diamondbacks won the best-of-seven series, four
games to three, on a ninth inning, bases-loaded single by Luis Gonzales off New
York's Mariano Rivera, one of the most dominant post-season pitchers in history.
Due to the superb pitching by both teams and late inning heroics, the 2001 Series
has been regarded by baseball historians as one of the most exciting in the history
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Commissioner Allan H. "Bud" Selig announced a plan by the
owners of the thirty major league franchises to "contract" the league
by eliminating two teams before the start of the 2002 season.3 The
owners of the league's thirty franchises overwhelmingly approved
the plan in order to alleviate some of the league's economic
struggles.4  In order to accomplish this proposal, the
Commissioner's Office and franchise owners relied on an
exemption to federal antitrust laws that Major League Baseball has
enjoyed since the 1922 United States Supreme Court decision in
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs.5 Congress quickly responded on
November 14, 2001, when late United States Senator Paul
Wellstone and United States Representative John Conyers
introduced the "Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act
of 2001'"6 to attempt to halt the threat of contraction statutorily.
This legislation proposes to make federal antitrust legislation
applicable to the elimination or relocation of Major League Baseball
franchises.'
In drafting the FANS Act, Senator Wellstone and Representative
Conyers modeled the Curt Flood Act of 1998.8 The Curt Flood Act
was meticulously crafted by Congress in collaboration with Major
League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA) so that it would place a specific limitation on
professional baseball's federal antitrust exemption and not
unintentionally affect the application of the exemption to other areas
of the game.' The current wording of the FANS Act, however,
significantly diverges from that of the Curt Flood Act. The
of the game.
3. Press Release, Major League Baseball, Major League Baseball Votes to
Contract Two Teams (Nov. 6, 2001), at http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/
mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news-story.jsp?articleid=mlb_20011106_ownersvote_
pr&teamjid=mlb (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
4. Id. Major League Baseball argues that under current economic conditions,
many teams are unable to produce enough local revenue to ever achieve long-term
competitive and financial stability. See Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Bud
Selig, Commissioner, Major League Baseball). It claims that as a result the teams
collectively lose hundreds of millions of dollars each year, such that the league is
in debt for over $3 billion. Id. It argues that in order for the league to survive at
least two teams need to be eliminated, as the local revenue generated in those
markets is "simply insufficient to justify [the] continued investment in [them]." Id.
5. 259 U.S. 200, 42 S. Ct. 465 (1922).
6. S. 1704, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3288, 107th Cong. (2001).
7. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2003).
9. Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Bud Selig, Commissioner, Major
League Baseball).
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ramifications of the divergence could significantly affect many more
aspects of professional baseball than the elimination or relocation
of franchises. Therefore, Congress should not pass the FANS Act
of 2001 as it is currently written, and alternative solutions should be
explored to protect fans and cities from the contraction of Major
League Baseball teams. Ultimately, the best solution is to revise the
FANS Act, constructing it so that its scope more closely emulates
that of the Curt Flood Act of 1998. This would avoid the
unintended consequences that the FANS Act currently presents.
The first step in a thorough analysis of the FANS Act requires
a study of the evolution of Major League Baseball's exemption to
federal antitrust laws, the effects of that exemption, and all remedies
to the problems created by the exemption. Part I of this analysis
will provide a general overview of federal antitrust legislation. Part
II will analyze the history of baseball's exempt status through
numerous court decisions and legislative action. Part InI will then
look at the effects that this exempt status has on various aspects of
the game, specifically on free agency, the minor league system, and
the contraction or relocation of franchises. Part IV will explore the
effects that the proposed act would have on the issues created by
professional baseball's exemption to antitrust legislation. This part
will also explore the effects of alternative measures such as a
judicial overruling of the original creation of the exemption, or a
revision of the current wording of the FANS Act., Finally, the
conclusion will assert that, in order to best protect baseball fans
from the danger of contraction without unintentionally upsetting
other aspects of the game, Congress must revise the FANS Act so
that it more closely emulates the carefully worded Curt Flood Act
of 1998.
I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
The driving force behind America's free enterprise system of
economics is competition." The struggle between competitors for
business creates an environment of efficiency where many parties
must supply consumers with quality goods and services at
reasonable prices or risk being driven from the market." The
environment of the late nineteenth century, however, did not
conform to this desired model. During that time, American
businesses thrived, showing enormous gains in both size and





strength.12 As a result of this.period of immense prosperity, some
businesses acted shrewdly to overpower competitors and began to
dominate their markets creating monopolies or "trusts," particularly
in the oil, steel, sugar, and tobacco industries.13
Recognizing the increasing monopolization of the American
economy, President Benjamin Harrison in 1889 called for legislation
to control "dangerous conspiracies against the public good."14 This
call to action resulted in the passage in 1890 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act,15 which today remains at the core of antitrust legislative policy.16
Section 1 of the Sherman Act detailed a sweeping proscription of
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states."' 7 For this section to apply, there must be at least two parties
joining to restrain interstate commerce. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
similarly prohibits monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize
any part of interstate commerce.1 8
Courts found it difficult to enforce the Sherman Act in its early
years, however.' 9 Legislators observed two deficiencies in the
Sherman Act: (1) it did not address threats to competition in their
incipiency, and (2) it was excessively general in that it did not include
a prohibition of specific practices with anti-competitive effects. 2' As
a result, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914.21 This Act
prohibits a detailed list of practices that "may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce." 22 Thus, the Clayton Act expands the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act in regulating activity which may not constitute a trade
restraint but may develop into one in the future.23 These two acts
provided the basis on which the courts would apply antitrust
legislation to all industries in the future, except for professional
baseball.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 38 (2nd ed. 2001).
14. Shenefield, supra note 10, at 9.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2003).
16. Shenefield, supra note 10, at 9.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003).
18. Id. § 2.
19. Shenefield, supra note 10, at 20.
20. Id.
21. Id. §§ 12-27a.
22. Id. For example, Section 2 of the Clayton Act prohibits price
discrimination between different purchasers of the same grade and quality of
commodity. Id. § 13. Section 3 prohibits certain exclusive dealing or tying
agreements. Id. § 14. Finally, Section 7 prohibits certain types of acquisitions of
businesses by another business that would tend to create a monopoly. Id. § 18.
23. Shenefield, supra note 10, at 20.
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1I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A. Top of the First: Lead-off Home Run in the Establishment of
the Exemption
Baseball's long history of exempt status from federal antitrust
regulation began with the 1922 Supreme Court decision in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs. In that case, a member club of the fledgling Federal
League of Professional Baseball Players sued the American and
National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs' for damages
resulting from the destruction of the Federal League. 26 The Federal
Club of Baltimore claimed that the American and National Leagues
violated the antitrust laws of the Sherman Act and created a monopoly
of the "baseball business" either by inducing Federal League member
clubs to leave the Federal League or by simply purchasing them.27 The
Court rejected this argument, however. Justice Holmes' majority
opinion reasoned that the "business is giving exhibitions of base ball
[sic], which are purely state affairs., 2' He then concluded that,
although the Leagues "must induce free persons to cross state lines and
must arrange and pay for their doing so" in order to give those
exhibitions, the character of the business did not change. Justice
Holmes supported his position by stating that the transport was "mere
incident, not the essential thing.""0 According to the Court's ruling, the
leagues were not guilty of violating antitrust regulation because the
business of providing public baseball games for profit was not
considered to be an element of interstate commerce and, thus, was not
subject to the Sherman Act.3 With this ruling, professional baseball's
exemption to federal antitrust legislation was created.
B. Top of the Third: Major League Baseball Scores Again with
Toolson
In 1953, the United States Supreme Court again confronted the
applicability of federal antitrust laws to professional baseball in
24. 259 U.S. 200, 42 S. Ct. 465 (1922).
25. These two leagues are still in existence today as the two Leagues that
comprise Major League Baseball.
26. Federal Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 207, 42 S. Ct. at 465.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 208, 42 S. Ct. at 466.
29. Id. at 208-09, 42 S. Ct. at 466.
30. Id. at 209, 42 S. Ct. at 466.
31. Id.
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Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.32 Here, the Court affirmed the
decision of Federal Baseball and ruled that if the resulting exemption
was improper, Congress would have enacted prospective legislation
to address the issue in the thirty years after Federal Baseball.33 In its
majority opinion, the Court noted that "if there are evils in this field
which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be
by legislation."34 This simple statement created a strong barrier that
would protect professional baseball's antitrust exemption from future
judicial attacks.
In a passionate dissent, Justice Burton, joined by Justice Reed,
presented the argument that developments in the "business" of
organized baseball since the ruling in Federal Baseball meant that
Major League Baseball was now, in fact, engaged in interstate
commerce. Therefore, he argued that Federal Baseball should be
overturned and that professional baseball should be subject to federal
antitrust legislation.36 To support his position, Justice Burton
enumerated developments such as the expenses involved in
conducting interstate competitions between teams, numerous
purchases of materials in interstate commerce, and the interstate
travel of fans to attend games.37 Justice Burton also recognized the
impact that radio and television would have on the "business" of
baseball, as well as the amount of money spent on interstate
advertising.38 Nevertheless, the majority affirmed Federal Baseball,
and the exemption survived.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court declined to grant such an
exemption to other professional sports leagues, including the National
Football League and the National Basketball Association. In
Radovich v. National Football League,39 the Court ruled that the
volume of interstate business involved in professional football placed
it within the provisions of the Sherman Act.4" The Court also ruled
that the exemption created in the holdings of Federal Baseball and
Toolson was specifically limited to professional baseball and not to
be extended to other fields of business.4 Similarly, in Haywood v.
National Basketball Association, 2 the Court flatly stated that
32. 346 U.S. 356, 74 S. Ct. 78 (1953).
33. Id. at 357, 74 S. Ct. at 78-79.
34. Id., 74 S. Ct. at 79.
35. Id. at 364-65, 74 S. Ct. at 83.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 357-58, 74 S. Ct. at 79.
38. Id.
39. 352 U.S. 445, 77 S. Ct. 390 (1957).
40. Id. at 452, 77 S. Ct. at 394.
41. Id. at 451, 77 S. Ct. at 394.
42. 401 U.S. 1204, 91 S. Ct. 672 (1971).
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professional basketball did not enjoy an exemption from antitrust
laws,4 3 thus preserving the unique nature of professional baseball's
immunity from federal antitrust legislation.
C. Bottom of the Fifth: Major League Baseball Strikes Out the
Side with Salerno and Flood
In 1970, the Second Circuit confronted the issue of professional
baseball's antitrust exemption. In Salerno v. American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs," a group of former umpires brought an
antitrust action against the American League, claiming that they were
discharged because they attempted to organize for the purpose of
collective bargaining.45 The appellate court dismissed the complaint,
ruling that the Supreme Court should "retain the exclusive privilege of
overruling its own decisions," even though Federal Baseball was "not
one of Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days" and the rationale of Toolson
was "extremely dubious."'  Thus, again a court reluctantly affirmed
professional baseball's antitrust exemption on grounds of stare
decisis.47
The United States Supreme Court did not address the issue again
until 1972 in Flood v. Kuhn48 where St. Louis Cardinals center-fielder
Curt Flood sued the Commissioner's office contending that Major
League Baseball's reserve system 49 violated federal antitrust laws.5"
Once again, the Court affirmed the exemption of professional baseball
from antitrust laws, this time conceding it to be "an established
[aberration]." '51 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that Toolson was
entitled to the benefit of stare decisis for four reasons: (1) congressional
awareness of the ruling in Federal Baseball, coupled with
congressional inaction, (2) the development of baseball since that ruling
with the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust laws,
(3) a reluctance to overrule Federal Baseball, producing retroactive
effect,5 2 and (4) the Court's professed desire in Toolson that any remedy
43. Id. at 1205, 91 S. Ct. at 673.
44. 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
45. Id. at 1004.
46. Id. at 1005.
47. The doctrine of stare decisis states that once a court has ruled on an issue,
all lower courts are bound by that decision.
48. 407 U.S. 258, 92 S. Ct. 2099 (1972).
49. Id. at 289, 92 S. Ct. at 2115. Under the reserve system, a player was
essentially bound to the club with which he first signed a contract for the entirety
of his playing days.
50. Id. at 258, 92 S. Ct. at 2100.
51. Id. at 282, 92 S. Ct. at 2112.
52. Generally, a judicial overruling of a prior Court decision has retroactive
effect, since it is deemed that the original ruling was in error, and thus was never the
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should be provided for by legislation rather than court decree.53
Essentially, the Court decided that overruling Federal Baseball and
Toolson would be more harmful to professional baseball than the value
of settling an inconsistency in the law.54 Justice Blackmun reasoned
that "there is merit in consistency even though some might claim that
beneath that consistency is a layer of inconsistency.
' 51
D. Seventh Inning Stretch
Since the decision in Flood v. Kuhn, the issue of the application of
antitrust legislation to professional baseball has not again reached the
Supreme Court. As noted by MLBPA Chief Donald Fehr in his
prepared statement to the House Judiciary Committee, the Court is not
likely to clarify the issue.5 6 Recent history suggests that at any point in
litigation where the continued validity of the antitrust exemption is in
question, Major League Baseball will quickly settle the case.57 One
recent example was the case of Piazza v. Major League Baseball.58 In
Piazza, the parties quickly reached an undisclosed settlement after the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
denied Major League Baseball's motion to dismiss an antitrust claim
on grounds of its exemption.59
E. Ninth-Inning Comeback: The Curt Flood Act of 1998
In 1998, Congress enacted the Curt Flood Act, which is the only
legislation that has limited Major League Baseball's exemption to
federal antitrust regulation.60 The Act applies federal antitrust law to
actions "directly relating to or affecting employment of ma or league
baseball players to play baseball at the major league level." The Act
then fists a strict limitation to the scope of its application so that it will
not affect aspects of professional baseball such as the minor league
law. Legislation, on the other hand, is deemed to be a change in the law, and as
such is prospective. In his dissent, however, Justice Marshall notes that in rare
circumstances the Court may give its ruling with prospective effect only. Id. at 293,
92 S. Ct. 2117.
53. Id. at 273-74, 92 S. Ct. at 2107-08.
54. Id. at 284, 92 S. Ct. at 2112-13.
55. Id., 92 S. Ct. at 2113.
56. Hearing, supra note 1, at 27 n.5 (prepared statement of Donald M. Fehr,
Executive Director, Major League Baseball Players Association).
57. Id.
58. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
59. Hearing, supra note 1, at 27 n.5 (prepared statement of Donald M. Fehr,
Executive Director, Major League Baseball Players Association).




structure, the amateur draft, franchise expansion, relocation, or other
ownership issues,62 conduct protected by the Sports Broadcasting Act
of 1961, °3 the relationship between baseball and umpires, or "any
conduct.., not in the business of organized professional major league
baseball."' This strict limitation was meticulously constructed by
Congress in collaboration with Major League Baseball and the MLBPA
so that the Act would not result in any unintended consequences and
would only affect the application of antitrust laws to the employment
of major league players.
Although the Curt Flood Act is the only legislatively expressed
limitation on professional baseball's antitrust exemption, it has been
criticized as practically ineffective.65 Major League Baseball players
negotiated an end to the monopolistic reserve system of employment
by means of collective bargaining more than twenty years prior to the
Act.66 That negotiation has since become a permanent fixture in
subsequent labor agreements. Nevertheless, the Act closed the door on
the possibility for owners to restrict the employment of Major League
Baseball players under an exemption to federal antitrust laws." More
significantly, the Act was the first indication that Congress was ready
to reexamine the appropriateness of professional baseball's antitrust
exemption.
F. Extra Innings?: Developments Since the Announcement of
Contraction
The issue of baseball's antitrust exemption did not come into the
spotlight again until shortly after the 2001 World Series. Major
62. Id. Presumably, the possibility of contraction had not yet been
contemplated at the time the Curt Flood Act was drafted and passed. Thus, it was
not specifically included as one of the protected ownership issues.
63. Id. §§ 1291-1295. The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 states:
The antitrust laws.., shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among
persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports
of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs
participating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey
contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such
league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of
football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in
or conducted by such clubs.
Id. § 1291.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b) (2003).
65. See J. Gordon Hylton, Why Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Still Survives,
9 Marq. Sports L.J. 391, 391 (1999).
66. These negotiations led to the modem concept of "free agency" by which a
player who is not under contract with a Major League team may freely enter into




League Baseball's Commissioner Allan H. "Bud" Selig announced
that he planned to "contract" the league by eliminating two unnamed
franchises before the start of the 2002 season in order to remedy the
68league's economic woes. This announcement prompted a flurry of
legal debate in Florida and Minnesota, the homes of three leading
candidates for contraction.69
In the state of Florida, State Attorney General Robert Butterworth
issued Civil Investigative Demands relating to the proposed
contraction, pursuant to state antitrust law. In Major League Baseball
v. Butterworth,7° Major League Baseball sued for injunctive relief
from these investigative demands.7" Major League Baseball claimed
that contraction was part of the "business of baseball" and therefore
exempt from antitrust law.72 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida unequivocally rejected the Florida
Attorney General's claim that the antitrust exemption enjoyed by
baseball applied only to reserve clause issues.73 District Judge Hinkle
stated that "[i]t is difficult to conceive of a decision more integral to
the business of major league baseball than the number of clubs that
will be allowed to compete."74 Therefore, the Florida court concluded
that contraction, too, was included in the "business of baseball," and
was thus exempt from both federal and state antitrust legislation.75
The announcement of the planned contraction of the Major
Leagues also led to the proposal of the "Fairness in Antitrust in
National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001" by the late United States
Senator Paul Wellstone and United States Representative John
Conyers on November 14, 2001.76 The wording of this proposed
68. Press Release, supra note 3.
69. At the time of the announcement, the Florida Marlins, Tampa Bay Devil
Rays, and Minnesota Twins were three of the lowest revenue-producing franchises
in the Major Leagues. As a result, these teams were widely speculated to be
possible candidates for contraction, even though no formal announcement was made
by the Commissioner's Office of the teams that were in danger of being eliminated.
See Jim Street, Legislators Debate Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, Major League
Baseball News, Nov. 11, 2001, at http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/
mlb/mlb/news/mlbnewsstory-archive.jsp?article id=archivecontraction&tea
m_id=mlb (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
70. 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
71. Id. at 1318.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1323. District Judge Hinkle analyzed the applicability of the
exemption in "excruciating detail" over a nine-page, five-part examination. Id. at
1323-35. The Florida Attorney General relied on the ruling of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Piazza, 831 F. Supp. 420,
438 (E.D. Pa. 1993) for his argument. Id. at 1322.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1322, 1333-34.
76. S. 1704, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3288, 107th Cong. (2001).
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legislation very closely tracks the Curt Flood Act of 1998. 7' The
FANS Act proposes to amend the Clayton Act such that federal
antitrust legislation would apply to the elimination or relocation of
Major League Baseball franchises. This legislation was the subject
of a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee on December 6,
2001,78 and has yet to be scheduled for a vote in the House of
Representatives. The proposed act was a result of immediate public
outcry following Commissioner Selig's announcement. It obviously
was intended to put an immediate halt to the threat of the elimination
of at least two Major League Baseball teams, particularly the
Minnesota Twins of Senator Wellstone's home state. Cleverly, the
sponsors named the proposed act such that its acronym would reflect
those people whom it was intended to protect-the fans.
Fortunately, the Minnesota Court of Appeals halted the immediate
threat of contraction for the 2002 season with its decision in
Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission v. Minnesota Twins
Partnership.79 In Metropolitan Sports, the Facilities Commission
(Commission) sued for a temporary injunction to force the Minnesota
Twins to play its home games for the 2002 season in the Metrodome
pursuant to the use agreement signed between the team and the
Commission. ° Judge Harry S. Crump of the District Court for
Hennepin County granted the injunction, and upon review, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Judge Crump did not abuse his
discretion in granting the temporary injunction, thus affirming the
ruling.8' On February 4, 2002, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied
a review of the case, and subsequently Commissioner Selig
announced that the plans of contraction would be postponed until
after the 2002 season.82 Later, on August 30,2002, the Major League
Baseball owners and the MLBPA reached a collective bargaining
agreement that stipulated that the owners would forgo plans of
contraction during the life of the agreement which lasts until
December 17, 2006.83
77. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2003).
78. Hearing, supra note 1, at 17 (statement by Jesse Ventura, Governor, State
of Minnesota).
79. 638 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
80. Id. at 218.
81. Id. at 214, 229-230.
82. Carrie Muskat, Contraction Will Not Happen in 2002, Maior League
Baseball News, Feb. 5, 2002, at http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/
mlb/mlb/news/mlb_newsstory.isp?article id=mlb_20020205_contractionnews
&teamid=mlb (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
83. Tom Singer, Deal in Place, Games Go On, Major League Baseball News,
Aug. 30, 2002, at http://mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/
mlb_news.isp?ymd=20020830&contentid= 116907&vkey=news mlb&fext=.jsp
(last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
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III. EFFECTS OF THE EXEMPTION TO FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LEGISLATION
Collective bargaining and the recent Curt Flood Act have resolved
the effects of the antitrust exemption with regards to the employment
of ballplayers. However, the exemption to antitrust legislation also
has effects on many other aspects of the industry of professional
baseball.84 Most notably, the exemption allows for the organization
of baseball's unique and highly organized minor league system of
development,85 it permits the league to prohibit a team from
relocating from one city to another, and it allows for the possibility
that the league could unilaterally decide to eliminate teams from the
Major Leagues.
First, professional baseball's exemption from antitrust laws
allows for the existence of an elaborate structure of leagues for the
development of players bound together by the Agreement of the
National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues.86 Under this
agreement, more than one hundred teams in many leagues agree to
follow common rules to insure the economic viability of them all."
These rules include concepts of league classifications, salary caps,
and restricted rights for minor league players.
88
This organized system of player development is unique to
baseball among all professional sports. Its entrenchment is one of the
main reasons why professional baseball continues to enjoy an
exemption to federal antitrust laws, while other professional sports
that do not have such a system, such as football and basketball, are
denied an exemption.89 As noted by one commentator, this system
immediately raises serious antitrust problems, because it relies on
rules "granting teams exclusive territorial rights and restrictinfg the
freedom of players to sell their services on the open market."9 On
the other hand, the structure of player development in professional
baseball has been allowed to develop under the long-standing
exemption to antitrust laws and is accepted by both the American and
the sporting public.91 Actually, "most fans, and probably most
84. Hylton, supra note 67, at 391.
85. Under this system, each Major League club affiliates a number of Minor
League clubs of various classifications. When a team drafts or signs a player, he
is placed in this system, whereby the organization can monitor his progress, provide
him with instruction, and develop the player as it best sees fit.
86. Hylton, supra note 67,at 392-93.
87. Id. at 393.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 400--01.
90. Id. at 393.
91. Id. at 394.
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players, have accepted the conventional wisdom that the stability of
professional baseball has been possible only because of these very
restrictions. 92
Subsequently, in the Curt Flood Act, Congress included an
explicit provision-one emulated in the proposed FANS Act-
declaring that the new legislation would not affect the application of
antitrust laws to the agreement between Major League Baseball teams
and the teams of the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues. 93 The impact that the exemption has on this aspect of
professional baseball, manifested in today's minor league system,
presents the strongest argument for why the exemption has been
perpetuated, even though its inception presents a glaring
inconsistency with the modem view of "interstate commerce" in
relation to professional sports and the jurisprudence in Toolson and
its progeny offers dubious explanations for its persistence. 94
Second, the existence of the exemption to federal antitrust
regulation allows Major League Baseball to act as a governing body
to regulate the relocation of franchises.95 As a result of this power,
Major League Baseball has been the most stable of all major
professional sports.96 Not a single baseball team has relocated from
one city to another since 1971 when the Washington Senators moved
to Arlington, Texas, to become the Texas Rangers.97 As recently as
1993, Major League Baseball blocked the attempted relocation of the
San Francisco Giants from California to St. Petersburg, Florida, as a
result of its exemption from federal antitrust laws.9" Without the
benefit of the exemption, San Francisco fans might have never seen
Barry Bonds' record setting campaign in 2001 or his equally
impressive performance in 2002, when he led the Giants to the
National League Wild Card and eventually to the World Series.99
92. Id.
93. Id. at 395.
94. Id. at 402.
95. Bryan Day, Labor Pains: Why Contraction Is Not the Solution to Major
League Baseball's Competitive Balance Problems, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media
& Ent. L.J. 521, 545-46 (2002).
96. Id. at 546.
97. Id.
98. Hearing, supra note 1, at 61 (statement of Bud Selig, Commissioner, Major
League Baseball).
99. The San Francisco Giants defeated the Atlanta Braves in the best-of-five
National League Divisional Series three games to two. The Giants then went on
to defeat the St. Louis Cardinals four games to one in the National League
Championship Series, sending them to the World Series, where they were defeated
by the Anaheim Angels four games to three. See The Official Site of the San
Francisco Giants, at http://sanfrancisco.giants.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/history/
postseasonjresults.jsp (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
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In contrast to the stability of Major League Baseball, the National
Football League has witnessed numerous relocations in the same time
period: the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles, the Baltimore Colts to
Indianapolis, the St. Louis Cardinals to Phoenix, the Los Angeles
Rams to St. Louis, the Raiders from Los Angeles back to Oakland,
the Cleveland Browns to Baltimore, and the Houston Oilers to
Memphis, then to Nashville."°° Similarly, the National Basketball
Association witnessed the Vancouver Grizzlies move to Memphis,
Tennessee in 2001 and the Charlotte Hornets move to New Orleans,
Louisiana in 2002. These two leagues do not have the benefit of the
federal antitrust exemption enjoyed by Major League Baseball, nor
does the National Hockey League, which has also seen numerous
franchise relocations over the last thirty years.'
Third, the exemption to federal antitrust legislation allows Major
League Baseball franchise owners to buy out one of the other member
owners and subsequently to eliminate a team from the Major Leagues
as proposed by Commissioner Selig on November 6, 2001. As a
result, Major League Baseball is able to control the supply of its
product and its price, all without accountability to the government or
the public."0 2  The absurdity of such a situation is clearly
demonstrated by the hypothetical presented by Minnesota Governor
Jesse Ventura above.' These latter two effects of the federal
antitrust exemption have sparked the most discussion as to whether
the FANS Act should be passed.
IV. EFFECTS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND OTHER POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS
One can suggest several possible methods to resolve the situation
surrounding Major League Baseball's contraction controversy. First,
the Supreme Court could overrule Federal Baseball and its progeny,
which would repeal professional baseball's exemption to federal
antitrust legislation entirely. Second, Congress could pass the FANS
Act and eliminate the issues of contraction and franchise relocation
from baseball's antitrust exemption. Third, Major League Baseball
owners and the MLBPA could negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement that would temporarily prohibit the owners from
100. Don Nottingham, Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and
Trademark Law as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise
Relocation, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1065, 1065 n.6 (2004).
101. Day, supra note 95, at 546.





contracting the league for the duration of the agreement, which they
did in the current collective bargaining agreement.
Ultimately, the best method for a permanent solution would be for
Congress to pass a revised version of the FANS Act, one that would
limit professional baseball's antitrust exemption as it relates to
contraction and relocation without affecting other aspects of the
game. Such a revision would eliminate the threat of contraction and
promote competition in the market for major league franchises
without otherwise affecting the state of the game. Additionally, this
revised legislation would have the permanency that a collective
bargaining agreement lacks. Therefore, Congress should take action
and pass a revised version of the FANS Act that more closely
emulates the scope of the Curt Flood Act. This would subject
professional baseball to federal antitrust legislation as it relates to
contraction and relocation without producing any unintended
consequences.
A. Strike One: Complete Reversal of Federal Baseball and
Toolson
First, Congress could pass a bill that would signify a complete
overruling of the decisions in Federal Baseball and Toolson. Such
action is strongly supported by Governor Ventura and the MLBPA.I°4
The principal argument behind this viewpoint is that the rationale
behind the rulings in Federal Baseball and Toolson-that
professional baseball is not involved in interstate commerce-is
antiquated and improper given today's realities.'0 5 Supporters also
argue that the exemption created by these rulings is not necessary for
professional baseball to prosper, comparing baseball to all other
industries and sports that do not enjoy exempt status."° Removing
the exemption would put all professional sports on a level playing
field.
Professional baseball is unlike any other professional sport,
however, due to its minor league structure of player development. A
complete removal of the exemption could severely impact the
structure of the minor leagues. Currently, minor league teams that
have major league affiliates do not pay the salaries of their players.
Rather, the respective major league clubs pay the players' salaries.
The minor league franchises obviously benefit from this arrangement
104. Id. at 76 (testimony of Jesse Ventura, Governor, State of Minnesota); Id.
(testimony of Stephen A. Fehr, Representative, Major League Baseball Players
Association).
105. Id. at 17 (testimony of Jesse Ventura, Governor, State of Minnesota).




since they typically do not produce the amount of revenues necessary
to support a team. °7 In return for assuming this expense, the major
league clubs retain the right to assign players to the clubs of various
classifications at any time.10 8 Also, the major league teams benefit
from low fixed salaries of minor league players and exclusive rights
to their services."° The effect of a total reversal of the decisions in
Federal Baseball and Toolson would be the complete destruction of
this widely accepted staple of professional baseball. Teams would
have to negotiate individually with each player in the minor leagues
and would be at risk of losing players in whom they have spent a
great amount of time and money developing.
If the issue concerning the judicial creation of an exemption to
federal antitrust laws for Major League Baseball had first been
presented today, the Court would undoubtedly reject it. However, a
different set of circumstances surrounds this issue. Major League
Baseball has developed a unique system in reliance on the exemption
that has been perpetuated over the last eighty years. Therefore, some
form of the exemption created in 1922 must remain. Overturning
Federal Baseball and its progeny would be unwise, even though the
foundation they have created on which the exemption rests is weak.
B. Foul Ball, Strike Two: The FANS Act of 2001
The proposed FANS Act of 2001 presents a different set of
problems. As proposed, the FANS Act states that its purpose is to
subject the elimination and relocation of Major League Baseball
franchises to federal antitrust laws."' The Act also stipulates that
"[a]ny person... injured by a violation of subsection (a), shall have
standing to bring action under such subsection based on such
violation.""' The consequence of this legislation would be to thwart
Major League Baseball's proposal for the contraction of two teams,
as this plan would then be subject to the provisions of the Sherman
107. Hylton, supra note 67, at 393.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 393-94.
110. S. 1704, 107thCong. (2001); H.R. 3288, 107thCong. (2001). Specifically,
Section 3 of the FANS Act amends the Clayton Act such that
the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of
organized professional major league baseball directly relating to or
affecting the elimination or relocation of a major league baseball franchise
are subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged






Act as a conspiracy in restraint of trade among the several states.
Should Major League Baseball proceed with plans for contraction,
any person injured by the violation would have legal recourse against
Major League Baseball.
Proponents of the bill cite the potential dangers involved if
owners are allowed to eliminate teams unilaterally."' As exemplified
in Governor Ventura's hypothetical," 3 the elimination of teams from
Major League Baseball would provide the other owners with a
financial windfall, as they would then have a greater share of
common revenues, such as those derived from merchandising and
television." 4 Also, they would benefit from decreased competition
in the market."5 Such ulterior motives would make the contraction
of the league through the elimination of teams a very lucrative and
enticing opportunity for owners to generate enormous amounts of
income. Proponents of the FANS Act also raise similar arguments to
those discussed above of fairness and resolution of inconsistencies in
the law.' 16 They see the Act as another opportunity to put baseball on
an equal position as professional football, basketball, and hockey." 7
Major League Baseball's most compelling argument against
passage of the FANS Act is that the antitrust exemption allows the
league to be the most stable of all professional sports in terms of
franchise relocation. Should this legislation be passed, Major League
Baseball argues that it would lose its ability to block teams from
relocating to other cities without league consent.1 18 The league
believes that without the unilateral power to control franchise
relocation, the stability that the league has preserved for thirty years
would be in great jeopardy." 9 The fear is that teams would be free to
relocate at will from one city to the greener pastures of another,
similar to what has been seen in the recent history of the National
Football League. 20 In such a situation, communities would be placed
112. Hearing, supra note 1, at 17-19 (statement of Jesse Ventura, Governor,
State of Minnesota).




117. S. 1704, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3288, 107th Cong. (2001). The
language of the FANS Act itself states that the conduct of Major League Baseball
should be subject to antitrust laws "to the same extent... if engaged in by persons
in any other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce." Id.
118. Hearing, supra note 1, at 64-65 (statement of Martin T. Meehan, Member,
Committee of the Judiciary); Day, supra note 95, at 544-46.
119. Hearing, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Bud Selig, Commissioner, Major
League Baseball); Day, supra note 95, at 544-46.
120. Hearing, supra note 1, at 64-65 (statement of Martin T. Meehan, Member,
Committee of the Judiciary); Day, supra note 95, at 544-46.
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at a great risk of being held hostage by teams that demand new
stadiums and other concessions in exchange for their continued
presence in their cities. If the teams' desires are not satisfied, they
would be free to relocate at any time where a more lucrative deal in
a more attractive market arises, and the league could do little to stop
them. 121
Major League Baseball argues that if this bill is passed, a city
would face a risk of losing a team to a now legislatively protected
relocation-a scenario that is much more likely than losing a team
through contraction. 122 In recent history, Major League Baseball has
a strong record of promoting stability by rejecting attempts to relocate
and encouraging sales of franchises to local investors or groups who
pledge not to move the team to another city.2 The passage of the
FANS Act would greatly impair the League from doing this in the
future.
The arguments on each side of this issue result in a difficult
conundrum. While passage of the FANS Act would prevent the
league from unilaterally eliminating teams without facing the risk of
liability, it would also damage the stability of the league by granting
owners legislative protection to relocate to the best market.
Conversely, the rejection of the proposed legislation would promote
stability in the league by allowing the league to retain the power to
reject relocation bids, yet allow it to retain the unilateral power to
decide to eliminate teams from the major leagues. Either way,
struggling small market cities, such as those home to the Minnesota
Twins and Montreal Expos, face grave danger of losing their teams.
Should the Act be passed, however, those parties affected by the
elimination of teams would have recourse against Major League
Baseball by virtue of the antitrust laws. Moreover, applying antitrust
laws to the relocation of franchises supports free market competition
for the benefits of having a Major League Baseball franchise. By
restricting franchise relocation from cities having difficulty
supporting its team, Major League Baseball ignores the pleas of other
viable regions across the country that are actively lobbying for a
major league franchise, such as Washington D.C. and Northern
Virginia.
121. Hearing, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Bud Selig, Commissioner, Major
League Baseball); Day, supra note 97, at 544-546. See Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) (ruling that
the NFL violated the Clayton Act by restraining an attempt by the Oakland Raiders
to move to Los Angeles and awarding treble damages).
122. In actuality, many of the bill's supporters appeared to favor the bill for this
reason, thus making it easier for a team to relocate into the Washington D.C.
area-a move which Major League Baseball has tried to resist.
123. Hearing, supra note 1, at 56 (statement of Bud Selig, Commissioner, Major
League Baseball).
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Major League Baseball repeatedly insists that the exemption is
absolutely necessary to protect small markets from losing their
franchises. That assertion is not exactly true, though. Even with
the application of antitrust laws to franchise relocation, if Major
League Baseball feels that a proposed move would be detrimental to
the best interest s of the game, it could still have the power to block
that relocation-even with the application of antitrust legislation. As
noted by MLBPA Chief Donald Fehr in his prepared statement to the
House Judiciary Committee, "the courts have never held that the
leagues have no control over relocations, just that they must have
reasonable rules in deciding when to permit a relocation. 1 25 The
National Basketball Association (NBA) recently employed such a
system of reasonable guidelines. The NBA required the city of New
Orleans to endure an arduous period of evaluation that spanned
several months before it would approve the relocation of the
Charlotte Hornets to New Orleans. The NBA required the team
owners and the city to meet several criteria regarding ticket sales,
sponsorship, and television rights and undertook a thorough
evaluation of the viability of the market before finally voting in June
2002 to allow the move. In fact, the league successfully blocked an
attempt by the Minnesota Timberwolves to relocate to New Orleans
in the early 1990s. The league was able to do this even without the
benefit of an antitrust exemption such as the one enjoyed by Major
League Baseball.
Nonetheless, Congress should reject the FANS Act because its
scope creates too much doubt about its applicability towards other
aspects of professional baseball. Although the FANS Act was drafted
to mirror the Curt Flood Act in its scope of application, it diverges
from that language significantly. This divergence could seriously
affect other areas of the game not contemplated by the drafters.
When the Curt Flood Act was drafted, Congress collaborated with
representatives from Major League Baseball and the MLBPA to
ensure that the limitation on baseball's antitrust exemption that it
created would be very narrowly drawn so as to minimize its
consequences.126 The FANS Act, however, by failing to incorporate
much of the meticulously crafted scope, would cause confusion as to
the applicability of antitrust laws to the movement of minor league
franchises, the amateur draft, the employment of minor league
players, expansion of the major leagues, and the relationship between
professional baseball and umpires. These consequences are obviously
124. Id.
125. Id. at 28 (prepared statement of Donald M. Fehr, Executive Director, Major
League Baseball Players Association).
126. Id. at 8 (statement of Bud Selig, Commissioner, Major League Baseball).
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outside the intended purpose of applying antitrust laws to the
elimination and relocation of Major League Baseball franchises.12 7
Therefore, Congress should not pass the FANS Act as it is currently
written.
C. Staying Alive with Two Strikes: The 2002 Collective
Bargaining Agreement
A third option would be to reject the current legislation and to
allow the dispute over contraction to be resolved through the process
of collective bargaining between the Major League owners and the
Major League Baseball Players Association. Such a strategy proved
effective in the aftermath of Flood v. Kuhn, where the Court's refusal
to overturn Toolson led to the subsequent creation of the system of
free agency by means of collective bargaining. 128 That bargaining
agreement governed baseball since its inception in 1975 until 1998,
when the Curt Flood Act was passed. 29 Today, the issue of player
free agency is still governed according to collective bargaining, even
though the Curt Flood Act grants players additional protections than
those which they enjoy through their agreement with the owners. 3 °
Similarly, the Major League Baseball Players Association has the
power to negotiate an agreement with ownership through collective
bargaining without the aid of legislation that would make any
contraction of the league impossible. Through such an agreement, as
opposed to a repeal of this facet of the exemption, the stability of the
league could still be maintained. The league would then have the
continued ability to restrict the relocation of franchises pursuant to the
exemption. Such a strategy was employed in the most recent
collective bargaining agreement reached on August 30, 2002.131
127. S. 1704, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3288, 107th Cong. (2001). Section 2
of the FANS Act states:
It is the purpose of this Act to state that the elimination or relocation of
major league baseball franchises are covered under the antitrust laws, and
to make clear that the enactment of this Act does not change the
application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any
other person or entity.
Id.
128. Hylton, supra note 67, at 391.
129, Id.
130. Id.
131. By reaching the "eleventh-hour" agreement, Major League Baseball owners
and players managed to complete negotiations and reach a collective bargaining
agreement without a work stoppage for the first time since 1972. See Barry M.
Bloom, Owners Approve New CBA, 29-1, at http://mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/
news/mlb-news.jsp?ymd=20020905&contentid=121870&vkey=news_mlb&fe
xt=.jsp (last visited Dec. 29, 2003).
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According to the terms of the agreement, the owners agreed to forgo
discussions of contraction during the life of the agreement until it
ends on December 17, 2006.1312
The new agreement has two problems, however. First, the
concession by the owners to "table" the possibility of contraction is
only a temporary one. 33 Second, in order to get that concession, the
Players Union agreed that it would not interfere if the owners decide
to downsize at the termination of the agreement.1t Therefore, the
issues and controversies surrounding contraction could resurface in
four short years. Most likely, the owners will again use the possibility
of contraction as a bargaining chip in the next set of labor
discussions. Therefore, a more permanent solution is desirable.
D. Base Hit: Revised Legislation that Narrows the Scope of the
FANS Act
As previously discussed, the motive behind the FANS Act is
valid, but deficiencies in its scope make it over-reaching. While the
Act would successfully eliminate the threat of contraction and
promote free market competition in the struggle for Major League
Baseball franchises, its scope is too broad and its risks affect other
areas of the game such as the minor leagues, the amateur draft, and
expansion. Similarly, the recently signed Collective Bargaining
Agreement alleviates the problem of contraction, but it is only
temporary. Moreover, the MLBPA has agreed not to contest
contraction should the owners still feel it is necessary at the end of the
current agreement.
The best solution is for Congress to revise the FANS Act, such
that it more closely emulates the scope of the Curt Flood Act.13 In
132. Singer, supra note 85.
133. Tom Singer, Contraction Concession a Surprise, at
http://nilb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb news.jsp?ymd=20020830&content
_id= 117281 &vkey=news mlb&fext=.jsp (last visited Dec. 29, 2004).
134. Id.
135. Section (b) of the Curt Flood Act lists the limitations on its application:
No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for changing
the application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements other than those set forth in subsection (a) of this section. This
section does not create, permit or imply a cause of action by which to
challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the antitrust laws to,
any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that do not directly relate to or
affect employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the
major league level, including but not limited to(l) any conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements of persons engaging in, conducting or
participating in the business of organized professional baseball relating to
or affecting employment to play baseball at the minor league level, any
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doing so, Congress would provide a permanent solution to the threat
of contraction and promote free market competition. Such legislation
would also leave other areas of the game unaffected. The structure
and normal practices of the minor leagues would remain intact, while
the amateur draft, major league expansion, franchise ownership issues
and the relationship between baseball and umpires would still be
areas governed under the authority of the antitrust exemption as
contemplated when the parties enacted the Curt Flood Act.
Specifically, there should be four changes in section 3(b) of the
current FANS Act. First, the following re-designations of subsections
should occur: subsection (1) should become subsection (2);
subsection (2) should become subsection (3); subsection (3) should
become subsection (4); and subsection (5) should become subsection
(6). Second, immediately preceding the newly designated subsection
(2), the following exception to the applicability of the Act should be
added:
(1) any conduct, act, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting
employment to play at the minor league level, any organized
organized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
reserve clause as applied to minor league players;
(2) the agreement between organized professional major league baseball
teams and the teams of the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, commonly known as the "Professional Baseball Agreement", the
relationship between organized professional major league baseball and
organized professional minor league baseball, or any other matter relating
to organized professional baseball's minor leagues;
(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons engaging in,
conducting or participating in the business of organized professional
baseball relating to or affecting franchise expansion, location or
relocation, franchise ownership issues, including ownership transfers, the
relationship between the Office of the Commissioner and franchise
owners, the marketing or sales of the entertainment product of organized
professional baseball and the licensing of intellectual property rights
owned or held by organized professional baseball teams individually or
collectively;
(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected by Public Law
87-331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the "Sports
Broadcasting Act of 1961");
(5) the relationship between persons in the business of organized
professional baseball and umpires or other individuals who are employed
in the business of organized professional baseball by such persons; or
(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons not in the
business of organized professional major league baseball.
15 U.S.C. § 26b(b) (2003).
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professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
reserve clause as applied to minor league players;
Third, the newly designated subsection (3) should be revised in part
and should read as follows to except franchise issue from the
applicability of the Act:
(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting
franchise expansion, franchise ownership issues, including
ownership transfers, the relationship between the Office of
the Commissioner and franchise owners, the marketing or
sales of the entertainment product of organized professional
baseball and the licensing of intellectual property rights
owned or held by organized professional baseball teams
individually or collectively; (revision italicized).
Finally, a new subsection (5), reading "the relationship between
persons in the business of organized professional baseball and
umpires or other individuals who are employed in the business or
organized professional baseball by such persons; or," should be
inserted to also except the relationship between professional baseball
and its umpires from the scope of the Act. By implementing these
revisions, the FANS Act would more accurately reflect the
collaborative effort of the Curt Flood Act and would have the narrow
scope necessary to avoid any unintended consequences.
V. CONCLUSION
The unique and complex structure of the relationship among the
various levels of professional baseball organizations makes some
form of professional baseball's federal antitrust exemption a
necessary evil. A complete judicial overruling or complete legislative
repeal of the exemption would have devastating effects on the
structure and continuity of the institution of the minor leagues. Such
a decision would have a comparatively small value by settling an
inconsistency in the law regarding professional baseball's role in
interstate commerce. Therefore, since professional baseball has been
allowed to develop under the protection of its exemption to federal
antitrust laws for over eighty years, the Supreme Court should not
revisit and overturn the decision in Federal Baseball and affirmed in
Toolson, nor should Congress pass legislation that completely repeals
the exemption.
Next, the application of federal antitrust laws to professional
baseball with regards to elimination or relocation of teams pursuant
2004] 409
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to the FANS Act creates a perplexing conundrum. While the Act
would thwart the threat of contraction, Major League Baseball argues
that the Act would damage the stability of the league by legislatively
protecting the unregulated relocation of major league franchises.
Although the league's argument is compelling, both of those effects
of the Act successfully foster the public interest by promoting free
market competition. Also, Major League Baseball could still
implement a set of guidelines that a franchise must satisfy in order to
relocate-similar to that seen in the NBA. Therefore, the premise
behind the FANS Act serves a valuable purpose. Nevertheless,
according to its current language, the FANS Act has too broad a
scope and affects too many more aspects of the game than necessary
or intended. Thus, the proposed FANS Act of 2001 should not be
passed into law.
While the current collective bargaining agreement temporarily
alleviates the problem, it is only temporary. Therefore, it also fails to
provide sufficient protection to baseball fans and cities from the
threat of contraction. The best solution to the situation created by
Commissioner Selig's announced proposal to "contract" Major
League Baseball is for Congress to revise the FANS Act, such that it
mirrors the scope carefully implemented by the Curt Flood Act of
1998. This approach would permanently eliminate the threat of
contraction, allow cities without teams to actively pursue a franchise,
and still permit Major League Baseball to promote the stability of
"the old ball game." Jean-Paul A. Escudier*
* J.D./B.C.L., May 2004, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University.
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